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Abstract
The soul, as a concept, has been a subject of philosophical 
inquiry in ancient, medieval and modern history of ideas. 
There is no universal agreement on the nature or purpose 
of the soul. Thus, the term “soul” has been given various 
definitions according to the philosophical theories and 
cultural perspectives in which it is defined. Soul, according 
to many religious and philosophical traditions, is the 
“self-aware essence” unique to a particular living being. 
In these traditions, the soul is believed to incorporate the 
inner essence of each living being. Both Plato and the 
Yoruba consider the soul as the immaterial element that, 
together with the material body, constitutes the human 
individual. Plato in The Republic presents a tripartite 
soul which harmonious interaction produces an esteemed 
human personality. This Plato’s idea mirrors the notion 
of the Yoruba that a man’s soul is the reflection of his 
personality. The word ‘soul’ has been investigated from 
divergent thematic perspectives ─ invisibility, intangibility, 
immortality and reincarnation ─ but this paper sets as its 
task to examine the Platonic and Yoruba presentations of 
the soul as the sole determinant of human personality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Greek word ψυΧή (psyche), translated as soul in 
English, is originally derived from a Greek verb which 
means “to cool”, or “to blow”, denoting animating 
principle in man and animal. Although the root of the 
word translated as soul denotes life in general, the 
term “soul” in Classical and modern context carries the 
meaning of an undying, immaterial essence that continues 
in conscious existence after death. The Homeric Age 
marked the beginning of different stages in the meaning 
of the term “soul” and other Greek words, such as θυμοѕ 
(breath), πνευµα  (Pneuma),  and νóus (mind), began to be 
used to represent the idea of soul. 
The pre-Socratic philosophers present different 
ideas of the soul. For instance, Thales, who was 
the first philosopher of historical record, explains 
his philosophical thought of soul in a term known as 
panpsychism, which is a philosophical view that the soul 
is a universal feature of all things, and primordial, from 
which all others are derived. Thales believes that the 
soul is the motive force. He uses as an example, magnet, 
which can move iron or metal. He claims that owing to 
this, the magnet possesses a soul. Anaximander gives the 
soul an aeriform structure, while Heraclitus depicts it as a 
fire.  Pythagoras, on the other hand, describes the soul as 
a harmony of perfect mathematics ratio and declares the 
soul to be immortal, maintaining that the highest purpose 
of humans should be to purify their souls by cultivating 
intellectual virtues, refraining from sensual pleasures, and 
practising special religious rituals. Democritus sees the 
soul as constituted of atoms. Both Plato and the Yoruba 
conceive the soul to be a spiritual entity that determines 
the personality of an individual.
1.  PLATO’S MYTH OF THE SOUL
With the various developments in the Greek context of 
the word ‘soul’, Plato views and describes the soul from 
different angles,  proffering  different theories in explaining 
what the soul is, ranging from its immortality to its function 
as the keeper of the person and as the moulder of human 
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personality. In the Laws, he defines the soul as “self-
movement” and “self-initiating motion” (896a-b). Plato 
describes man as being constituted of body and soul and 
considers the soul to be an independent, substantial reality 
and the essence of a person since the soul is prior to body, 
body secondary and derivative. Plato proves this through 
the process of elimination. There are three suppositions, 
one is that the human person is essentially a soul or a body 
or a combination of body and soul. The body does not rule 
itself; therefore, it cannot be a body. And if the body does 
not rule itself it cannot be in combination of the body and 
soul ruling. The soul rules over the body, then, the soul is 
the essence of the human person.  He considers the soul as 
the governor of the body “in the real order of things”, while 
the body is subjected to its governance (Laws, 896c). He 
further describes the soul as a being that decides how man 
behaves. He takes this essence to be an incorporeal and 
eternal occupant of human being.  
Sanford asserts that Plato, in The Republic, describes 
the soul as the “carrier of individual personality”. Plato 
extended this theory to the whole world, believing that 
the world has a soul because the world moves itself. 
Beyond this, God is of the nature of the soul because God 
is the Self-mover par excellence (Sanford, 1991, pp.75-
76). In the Timaeus, Plato talks of the soul of the world 
which, though consists of the Same, the Different, and 
Existence, is described as “invisible and endowed with 
reason and harmony, being the best creation of the best of 
intelligible and eternal things” (Timaeus, 36d-37a, Robert 
Gregg’s translation). The human soul is described here 
as originally complex but not partite as is the case in The 
Republic. Plato further explains that it is the 
Demiurge, who is co-eternal with the Forms and the Chaos, 
that is, the four elements: fire and earth linked by air and water, 
set all these in order, and then out of these he constructed this 
present universe… containing within itself all living creatures 
both mortal and immortal. (Timaeus 32a-b, 69c) 
The human being is one of the three classes of mortal 
beings created partially by the gods that were created by 
the Demiurge. The gods created the body, which is mortal, 
whereas the soul was placed in the body directly by God 
(Timaeus, 42e-43a). The soul is referred to as the guiding 
principle and the divine part. The individual souls are 
made out of the same stuff as the world soul, although it 
is explained that this stuff was not as pure as it was before 
and each soul is assigned a star (Timaeus, 41b-d). If a 
person lived well, upon the death of the body, the soul will 
return and dwell in his home star. If not, then the soul will 
not be re-incarnated (Timaeus, 42a-c).
According to Plato, man possesses two souls. One is 
immortal, which is created by the creator himself; while 
the other mortal, is fashioned by the gods, the offspring of 
the creator. The latter is subject to “terrible and irresistible 
affections” (Timaeus, 69c). The mortal soul is placed in 
the breast and thorax, while the immortal soul inhabits 
the head. The mortal and inferior soul is subdivided into 
two parts occupying different parts of the body. Plato 
says: “That part of the inferior soul, which is endowed 
with courage and passion   and loves contention, they 
placed nearer the head, midway between the midriff and 
the neck” (Timaeus, 70a). This part of the mortal soul is 
allied with immortal soul, which is to direct the other part 
of the inferior soul, the appetites, and put it in constant 
check. The same idea of the two souls, one for the good 
motion and one for the bad, is expressed in the Laws by 
the Athenian spokesman of Plato thus:
Hence we are driven, are we not, to agree in the consequence that 
soul is the cause of good and evil, fair and foul right and wrong 
in fact of all the contraries, if we mean to assert it as the universal 
cause?.. And is this done by a single soul, or by more than one? I 
will give the answer for both of you. By more than one. At least 
we must assume not fewer than two, one beneficent, the other 
capable of the contrary effect. (Laws, 896d- e)    
Plato proceeds to symbolize the form of the soul in the 
famous Chariot allegory, which can also be called myth of 
the soul. A soul, Socrates says, is like 
the union of powers in a team of winged steeds and their winged 
charioteer. While the gods have two good horses, everyone else 
has a mixture: One is noble and good, while the other has the 
opposite character and his stock are opposite. (Phaedrus, 246a-b) 
The souls being immortal, and without the bodies, 
patrol all of heaven as long as their wings are in perfect 
condition. But when a soul sheds its wings, it comes 
to earth and takes on an earthly body “which seems by 
reason of the soul’s power to move itself”. Then the 
structure of the soul and body composed becomes a living 
being (Phaedrus, 246e).
In his narration, Plato explains that, in heaven, there is a 
procession led by Zeus, who looks after everything and puts 
things in order. All the gods follow Zeus in this procession 
with the exception of Hestia─ the Greek goddess of home 
and hearth. With the state of the horses and charioteer, 
it is easy for the gods to control their chariots, but other 
charioteers must struggle with their bad horses, which will 
drag them down to the earth if it has not been properly 
trained (Phaedrus, 247a-b). As the procession makes 
its way upward, it eventually makes it up to the high 
ridges of the heaven, where the gods take their stands in 
a circular motion and gaze at all that is beyond heaven. 
What is outside of heaven, says Socrates, is quite difficult 
to describe, lacking colour, shape, or solidity, as it is the 
subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence, 
the soul’s pilot. The gods, delighted and nourished by 
reason and knowledge, feel wonderful. They go round until 
they make a complete circle. On the way, they are able to 
see Justice, Temperance and Knowledge, and other things, 
as they are in themselves, unchanging. Having seen all 
things and feasted on them, coming all the way around, 
they sink back down inside the heavens.
In order to become human, a soul must look at the 
truth. This, however, is not easy. Some souls see some 
things and miss the others, having to deal with their horses; 
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they rise and fall at varying times. Other souls, while 
straining to keep up, are unable to rise, and, in noisy, sweat 
discord, they leave uninitiated, not having seen reality. Any 
soul that catches sight of any of one true thing is granted 
another circuit where it can see more. Eventually, all souls 
fall back to earth. Those that have been initiated are put 
into varying human incarnations, depending on how much 
they have seen. Those who have seen the most incarnate 
as philosophers, while those who have seen less follow 
as kings, statesmen, doctors, poets, prophets, manual 
labourers, sophists, and tyrants. At this point, the Souls 
begin the cycle of re-incarnation, which, according to 
Plato, generally takes ten thousand years for a soul to grow 
its wings and return to where it came. But philosophers, 
who have chosen such a life for three consecutive times, 
grow their wings and return after only three thousand 
years. This is because they have seen the most and always 
keep the memory of what they have been as close as 
possible, and maintain the highest level of initiation.  
2 .   PLATONIC  CONCEPT OF  THE 
SOUL AS DETERMINANT OF HUMAN 
PERSONALITY
In Phaedo, Plato argues the immortality of the soul. 
However, in The Republic, he changes his dimension, 
analysing the soul from another perspective. In The 
Republic, Plato puts forward a new theory of the human 
soul, comparing the soul to an ideal society. He describes 
an ideal society has having three parts: the Guardians, 
who are the ruler of the state; the Auxiliaries, who support 
the ruling class; and the Workers, that can be regarded as 
the productive class, which includes merchants, farmers 
and other money makers.  With this ideal state, Plato 
presents a tripartite soul; namely: The rational, which is 
termed logos (το λογιστικον), the courageous or spirited 
(το υμητικον), and the appetitive (το νπιυμητικου). Plato 
believes that an ideal society or state starts by fulfilling 
ordinary human needs with perfect harmony as its 
objective which can only be achieved by having the most 
intellectually able citizens in charge. According to Plato, if 
each of these three parts of society plays its role perfectly 
well, the whole society will work well like a well-oiled 
machine and produce a just and ideal state. 
Having investigated how a just society functions with 
the harmony of the three social groups, Plato investigates 
a virtuous soul. Each of these parts of the soul, according 
to him, has a function in a balanced and peaceful soul. In 
order to prove that functions are performed by different 
parts of the human soul, Plato puts forward a principle 
which Annas terms the Principle of Opposites or Principle 
of Conflict (Annas, 1981, p.137). This principle shows 
that each of the parts of the soul has its own motivation 
and constitutes a faculty. Plato says:
The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same 
part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary 
ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things 
apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, 
but different... Imagine the case of a man who is standing and 
also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say 
that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same 
time- to such a mode of speech we should object, and should 
rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at 
rest. (The Republic, 436b-d: M. A. Jowett’s trans.)
With this principle, Plato emphasises the impossibility of 
a thing to be at rest and in motion at the same time as well 
as in the same part. Plato then analyses the three parts of 
the soul.
The first part of the soul is referred to as the logos, 
which Plato equates with the mind, nous or reason. It 
is also regarded as the intellectual part that seeks truth 
and knowledge. It has the responsibility of guiding and 
regulating life. It is also in charge of life in a way that is 
informed by wisdom and that takes into consideration the 
concerns of each of the three parts of the soul and of the 
soul as a whole (The Republic, 442c). This part, being the 
rational part, is able to do a logical calculation and bring 
about the good of the person as a whole and the overall 
Good, which Plato refers to as Virtue (Meno, p.73). In 
Plato’s view, the power by which man reasons, learns and 
makes judgments and decisions lies with the rational part 
of the soul, which also serves as a source of motivation. 
Plato avers:
But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavour of the 
part by which we learn  is ever toward knowledge of truth of 
things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and 
reputation. (The Republic, 581b)
Here, Plato says that desire to learn is part of the feature of 
this rational part of the soul. It can then be deduced from 
Plato’s expression that reason is the motivation which 
drives man to learn and seek the truth. This aspect of the 
soul is considered by Plato as the ruling element because 
of its ability to reflect on the better (good) and worse (evil) 
as well as its “being wise and exercising forethought in 
behalf of the entire soul” (The Republic, 441b-e). In order 
words, for the soul to rule wisely, its command must be 
informed by knowledge.
The next part is called thumos in Greek. It is the 
spirited part which comprises emotional motive. 
This aspect of the tripartition of the soul, spirit, is 
a motivating force that generally accounts for self-
assertion, ambition and love of honour, which makes 
man seek self- esteem by competing with others. 
Frustration of its desires gives rise to emotional 
responses, such as anger and indignation, and to 
behaviour that expresses and naturally flows from such 
responses. Socrates takes spirit to be a natural ally of 
reason; at least part of its function is to support reason in 
such conflicts as may arise between it and appetite (The 
Republic, 440ef – 442ab). It is the force that drives man 
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to acts of bravery and glory and, if it is left uncontrolled, 
it can lead to excessive pride, which was considered by 
the ancient Greeks to be the most ruinous of all vices. 
From Plato’s analysis, the reason or rational part 
of the soul corresponds with the guardians in an ideal 
society, while the spirited goes with the auxiliaries and 
the appetitive is likened to the workers, such as farmers 
and artisans. Although Plato identifies the spirited aspect 
of the soul as one that gives way to anger, he sees it 
as one which plays a very vital role in the soul. Just as 
the auxiliaries play important roles in supporting the 
guardians in an ideal state so the spirited part of the soul 
“is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by 
evil nurture” (The Republic,  441a). 
The final part is called eros, which Plato equates with 
appetite or desire that drives man to seek out his basic 
bodily needs, such as food, drink and love (The Republic, 
439d & 580e). It is an element closely connected with 
pleasure and satisfaction. According to the Platonic view 
of this part of the soul, when the passion controls man, 
it drives him towards hedonism in all forms. This part 
is independent of reason, which means that eros and 
thumos have no concern for the overall good and have 
in themselves no rational component. Plato portrays the 
appetitive part as being irrational because of its cravings 
or desires without qualification. For instance, Plato uses 
the example of thirst and hunger:
This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a class and 
that the most conspicuous members of that class are what we 
call thirst and hunger? Is not the one desire of drink, the other of 
food? Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more 
than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul? I mean is 
thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in word for 
a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat is 
attached to the thirst it would further render the desire ─ a desire 
of cold, and if cold of hot... But mere thirst will never be desire 
of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere 
drink, and so hunger of food. (The Republic, 437d-e) 
With Plato’s description of the appetitive part of the soul 
as described above, it would be out of place to assert 
that the appetitive lacks reasoning totally.  Annas (1981, 
p.145) avers that the appetitive part “has the ability to 
figure out the means to achieve the end it wants”. This 
notion is supported by the idea Plato portrays when he 
says:
We call it appetitive part because of the intensity of its 
appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their 
accompaniments, and likewise the money-making part, because 
money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desire. 
(The Republic, 580e)
From what Plato says above, it is evident that the 
appetitive element has the ability to use money as a means 
to acquire what it wants in order to satisfy its desires. With 
this, it can be deduced that the appetitive part is rational 
to some extent, though, not in any way comparable to the 
rational part of the soul.  
Just as the Guardians in Plato’s ideal state have the 
responsibility of guiding the auxiliaries and the workers, 
the rational part of the soul has the duty of guiding the other 
two parts ─ spirited and the appetitive. For the rational part 
to perform its duty effectively, there must be interaction 
among the sub-parts of the soul, Hsu (2007, p.148) 
asserts that inner conversation must take place within the 
appetitive part. By using this theory of tripartite soul, Plato 
tries to show how a man can be virtuous, relating virtue 
to the major themes found in The Republic ─ wisdom, 
courage, temperance and justice. To each of these three 
parts of the soul, is a corresponding virtue: For the rational 
or intellectual element, there is wisdom; for the spirited 
element, there is courage; for the appetitive element, there 
is moderation; while temperance is consisted in the union 
of the spirited and appetitive parts, which come under the 
rule of reason. Justice is regarded as the general virtue that 
enables every part of the soul to perform its proper function 
in due harmony.
Through these virtues the soul attains a certain 
concord or integrity, which Plato believes is the only real 
happiness worthy of the name.  A virtuous man is one of 
the three parts of his soul playing their roles perfectly well 
and remaining in harmony with one another. The idea of 
orderliness as reflected in Plato’s The Republic is not only 
applicable to an ideal society or state, but also to the man 
who can be regarded as just. From Plato’s point of view, a 
virtuous man is identified by his orderly and harmonious 
soul. Hence, it can be said that human virtue depends 
greatly on how these psychosomatic elements intermingle 
with one another.
 The aim of Plato’s claim that there are three parts of 
the soul is to show the psychological foundation of one’s 
virtuous or moral behaviour.  With the orderly interaction 
among the parts of the tripartite soul, Plato tries to show 
that complying with inner justice is the only rational way 
of living for an individual. From Plato’s analysis of the 
tripartite soul, it can be deduced that the soul is not just 
the principle of life, but the most precious possession 
of an individual, the very centre of his being, which 
harbours the nature of his personality and the value of 
his character. Plato attributes to the soul the function 
of “caring, ruling, planning”, and the like. He adds that 
living is also part of the function performed by the soul. 
This leads to the interim conclusion that a soul, with 
appropriate virtues, cares, rules, deliberates and lives 
well; whereas the soul with the relevant vices does these 
things badly. Another premise is that justice is the virtue 
suitable to the soul, while injustice is its vice. Hence, a 
just soul lives well; an unjust soul lives badly. But living 
well, according to the next premise, is being happy, 
whereas living badly is being wretched. So Socrates 
draws an interim conclusion that the just person, that is, 
a person whose soul is just, is happy; whereas the person 
whose soul is unjust is wretched.
63
Bosede Adefiola Adebowale (2014). 
Cross-Cultural Communication, 10(6), 59-67
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
3.  YORUBA TERMINOLOGIES FOR THE 
WORD SOUL  
In the traditional Yoruba vocabulary, there seems to be 
no word corresponding in meaning to the Greek word 
translated soul in English. Three terms o͎kàn, orí and è͎mí 
are used as equivalent to the word soul, depending on the 
context. The term ‘o͎kàn’ in English language is ‘heart’. 
The Yoruba view the heart from two perspectives: The 
first is the material heart that human beings have in 
common with the lower animals; this is the material 
heart that supplies blood through the veins into the other 
part of the body and, thus, makes all animate objects 
alive. But this material o͎ kàn, is regarded as a real 
representation of the other o͎kàn, which is essentially 
immaterial and invisible (Awolalu & Do͎pamu, 2005, 
p.180). This immaterial o͎kàn is the seat of intelligence, 
thought, action, emotion and psychic energy (Awolalu & 
Do͎pamu, 2005, p.181). And according to Do͎pamu (2006, 
p.4), o͎kàn is also used to denote that part of man called 
iyè (mind, mentality or rationality). The word o͎kàn is 
used in different ways but mostly in figurative manner, 
such as o͎kàn rè͎ ti lo͎ (He is buried in thought): o͎kàn mi 
sọ pé yóò wá (my mind tells me that he will come or I 
think he will come). In each of these expressions, it is 
not the physical o͎kàn ─ heart, that is being represented 
here but the immaterial o͎kàn. 
Orí is another Yoruba term used to represent the word 
‘soul’. The Yoruba traditional thought represents orí, like 
o͎kàn, in two ways. Literally, orí simply means head. But 
when the Yoruba speak of orí, they are not referring to the 
physical and visible head; rather, they speak of orí inú, 
inner or metaphysical head of each individual. The word 
orí is used in different contexts, like o͎kàn, in a metaphoric 
sense. Orí is viewed as an important element of a man that 
cannot be overlooked. Awolalu (1979, p.183) illustrates 
the importance of orí as the person’s guardian or protector 
through the advice given to a bride. A newly married 
woman is given instruction to take orí along to her 
husband’s house, not just beauty. This is because beauty 
is ephemeral, but orí abides with one in the husband’s 
house- “Mú orí lo͎, máà mú e͎wà lo͎: o͎jó͎ le͎wà n bo͎, orí ní 
bá ni gbélé o͎ko͎”.
Further usage of orí among the Yoruba confirms 
the fact that they think of orí as the personality ─ 
soul, human’s double, a semi-split entity or a person’s 
guardian angel. A person that is fortunate is described 
as Olórí-ire (One who possesses good orí) while one 
who is unfortunate is regarded as Olórí burúkú (one 
who possesses a bad orí). When a person is embarking 
on a journey, the Yoruba pray for the person: “Kí orí kí 
ó sìn é͎ lo͎ ò” (May orí go with you). Parents do pray for 
their children in the belief that their orí will affect them 
positively. An example is pointed out by Awolalu (1979, 
p.83): “Orí mi á sìn é͎ lo͎ ” (May my orí go with you). In 
other words, may my orí guide you and bless you. In 
another instance, if a person miraculously escapes from 
harm, he will say: “Orí mi yo͎ mí” (my orí saved me). 
And when accomplishment has been attained, the Yoruba 
say: “Orí bá mi s͎é” (my orí has enabled me to do it). The 
illustration cannot be exhausted. What is being stressed 
is that human beings have souls, which in, this context, is 
orí inú, which makes them rational, conscious, responsive 
and responsible. It is this orí inú, as personality soul, that 
differentiates human beings from animals and makes 
humans to be capable of knowing their maker, Olódùmarè, 
the Supreme Being.
È͎mí is also viewed as a divine element which links man 
directly to God, just as Plato considers the soul to be divine 
and spiritual. A renowned authority in Yoruba culture and 
traditional belief, expresses the Yoruba traditional opinion 
that è͎mí is the most appropriate equivalent word to the 
term soul. He compares è͎mí (soul) with the oil used to 
light the traditional lamp (fìtíla ̀). According to him, the 
light of the lamp radiates for as long as the lamp is filled 
with oil. The light, however, grows deem as the oil dries, 
and by the time the oil dried up, the lamp fades away. In 
the same way, man is full of life when the soul─ e͎m̀í─  is 
intact, but when è͎mí, like the oil, leaves the body, life is 
sniffed out of the body and it becomes lifeless (Kos͎eemani, 
2009).  È͎mí, unlike orí and o͎kàn, is viewed in two ways, 
it is an immaterial and intangible entity, which the Yoruba 
regard as the element that provides the “animating force” 
or “vital force of life” without which a person cannot 
be said to be alive not to talk of being conscious. È͎mí is 
variously translated as life, spirit or being. It is also used to 
refer to spiritual beings. Awolalu and Do͎pamu (2005, p.181) 
regard è͎mí as the vital principle, the seat of life. È͎mí is 
also thought of as the conscious self. According to Bascom 
(1960, p.410), it does not only provide locomotion for the 
body, but can also think independently of it and can travel 
abroad on its own in dreams. O͎ladipo͎ describes è͎mí as the 
“undying part of man which is given directly by the creator 
before man is born into the world”. He explains the Yoruba 
concept of è͎mí thus:
Generally speaking, è͎mí is regarded by the Yoruba as the basis 
of human existence. It is the entity which gives life to a person; 
its presence or absence in a person makes the difference between 
life and death. It is conceived as that divine element in man 
“which links him directly to God… Hence, in the event of death, 
it returns to Olódùmarè ─ who has among many of his attributes 
that of being the owner of life (E͎lé͎mìí) ─ to give an account of a 
person’s activities on earth and to continue to live. È͎mí then, for 
the Yoruba, is immortal (1992,  p.19).
The Yoruba use è͎mí in ways that it can be translated 
as “life” or “spirit,” depending on the context, such as 
Ó fé͎ gba è͎mí rè͎ (He wants to take his life); Ó pà àdánù 
è͎mí rè͎ (He lost his life); È͎ mí gùn ún (He is possessed 
by a spirit).Thus the Yoruba believe that è͎mí is the basis 
of human existence; it is the entity, which gives life to a 
person. As such, its presence or absence in a person makes 
the difference; its presence means life, while its absence 
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means death. È͎mí is also viewed as a divine element 
“which links man directly to God.
Generally, the Yoruba believe that a person is made 
up of three important parts: ara- (body), è͎mí- (the life-
giving element called soul), and orí inú- (inner head), 
which O͎ladipo͎ (1992, p.1) refers to as “the individuality 
element, which is claimed to be responsible for a person’s 
personality”. The Yoruba tripartite human composition is 
not to be confused with the Platonic tripartite soul, where 
the harmonious tripartite soul is responsible for human 
personality as just or unjust person. According to Awolalu 
and Do͎pamu (1979, p.155), the physical part of human 
composition is known as ara, while the immaterial is the 
nonphysical called “è͎mí”. The ara (body) is concrete, 
tangible, and visible and is made up of flesh and bones. 
È͎mí, on the other hand, is invisible and intangible. 
According to Bo͎laji Idowu (1962, p.169), as cited by 
Oyeshile (2006, p.54), “it is the è͎mí that gives life to the 
whole body and therefore can aptly be described through 
its causal functions”. Therefore, the presence of è͎mí, or 
its absence from the body, helps to determine whether a 
person is alive or dead. Accordingly, è͎mí can be regarded 
as the life force. Abimbo͎la (1991, p.77) asserts that the 
invisible spiritual element of human personality – è͎mí, has 
its “physical realization in the human head, and e͎sè͎ (leg), 
which is also known by same name on the physical plane.” 
Although many scholars of Yoruba culture and 
philosophy agree that e͎ ̀mí is the Yoruba term that 
best corresponds with the Greek word ψυΧή (psyche), 
translated soul in English, from various description of 
the word è͎mí, it is apparent that the word è͎mí does not 
correspond with the Platonic tripartite soul. Orí inu ́, the 
personality-soul, however, has a corresponding meaning 
to Plato’s tenet of the soul. While è͎mí is regarded as the 
life force and described by O͎ladipo͎ as the “undying part 
of man which is given directly by the creator before man 
is born into the world,” orí inu ́ is responsible for the 
personality of an individual. It is orí inú that makes man 
what he is, a just or an unjust person. Oyeshile is of the 
view that the description of orí inú─ inner head, as the 
personality soul and è͎mí as soul creates more confusion 
“since the two concepts and their functions seem to be 
lumped together” (Oyeshile, 2006, p.157). However, in 
relation to Yoruba belief, orí is responsible for human 
destiny (Àyànmó). È͎mí, on the other hand, is regarded as 
the ‘seat of life’, life force. Thus, the choice of a good orí 
in heaven brings success, while the choice of a bad orí 
brings failure to its bearer on earth.
4.  YORUBA TRADITIONAL CONCEPT 
OF ORÍ AS DETERMINANT OF HUMAN 
PERSONALITY 
It is generally believed by the Yoruba that a person is 
made up of three important parts ara- (body), è͎mí- (the 
life-giving element called soul), and orí inu ́-( inner head), 
which is responsible for a person’s personality. Barry 
Hallen and Sodipo acknowledge this tripartite conception 
of person in Yoruba traditional thought in this declaration:
For the Yoruba, the essential element of the person (eniyan) 
when in the world (aye) are the body (ara), the vital spirits of the 
body or sour (emi) and the destiny (ori) that which determines 
every significant event during the particular life time (1986, p. 
105).
Oladipo is of the same mind as Hallen and Sodipo on the 
tripartite conception of man in Yoruba traditional thought. 
According to him, the essential components of man are 
ara-(body), è͎mí, which he refers to as “life- giving entity,” 
and orí, which he terms the “inner head”. Oladipo, in his 
analytico-philosophical discourse points out that man’s 
constituent can be divided into two categories, material 
and immaterial elements. He describes ara as belonging 
to the material realm, while è͎mí and orí, belong to the 
immaterial realm thus supporting the Platonic dualism 
of human composition (1992, pp.14-16). Gbadege͎s͎in, in 
his analysis of Yoruba conception of a person considers 
ara- (body), è͎mí- (life giving element), orí- (inner head) 
and adds o͎kàn. To him ara is the physico- material part 
of man, whereas o͎kàn is an element in the structure of 
human person having a dual character. He does not just 
view o͎kan ̀ as an internal organ of the body responsible 
for pumping and circulating blood. He views it as an 
invincible part responsible for all forms of conscious 
identity. To Gbadege͎s͎in, è͎mí and orí belong to the non-
physical realm of human constitution. He construes è͎mí 
as the active principle of life, the life-giving entity that 
guarantees the conscious existence of a person for as long 
as it is in force. He considers the orí (inner head), as the 
bearer of human destiny as well as the determinant of a 
person’s personality. Explaining the significance of orí as 
an element of human person, Gbadege͎s͎in asserts that:
“orí” is therefore the determinant of the personality of the 
individual. The “è͎mí” as the active life force supplied by the 
deity is a common denominator... it cannot be the basis for 
identifying person as individual selves because it is common to 
all (1991, p.42).
From the analysis of Hallen and Sodipo, and 
Gbadege ͎s ͎in, orí (inner head), as one of the three or 
four components of a person, plays an important role of 
determining every significant event during the particular 
lifetime of a person. In other words, they claim that orí 
is the sole determinant of human personality in Yoruba 
traditional belief. However, Oladipo, though, pitches 
his tent with the tripartite conception of man does not 
subscribe to the opinion of orí being the sole determinant 
of human personality. He is of the opinion that there is 
no way any element of human constitution can solely 
determine human personality in Yoruba traditional 
thought. According to him, o͎po ͎lo͎ (brain), o͎kàn (physical 
heart), and ìfun (intestine), which are all material parts of 
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the body, perform “some mental and psychic functions”. 
He construes a person to be “an integrated physico-
chemical system whose conscious activities are product of 
the harmonious interaction between the various elements 
of subsystems.” (Oladipo, 1992, pp.17- 22)
Since orí is regarded as the central concept in 
Yoruba traditional conception of human personality, it 
is, therefore, important to discuss how orí is acquired 
according to Yoruba traditional thought. There are various 
myths of creation and methods of acquisition of orí. On 
the whole, the Yoruba believe that the body and the soul 
were not created simultaneously; they were created in 
order of priority. The body is believed to have been the 
first to be created and then the soul (Makinde, 2007, 
p.104). This is in contrast with the Platonic account of 
creation where the soul came first. The Yoruba concept 
of body first is based on the belief that Olódùmarè (The 
Almighty God) is the one responsible for the creation 
of the soul and he could only effect this work after 
Òrìs͎àńlá, who has been delegated with the responsibility 
of moulding both the body and the human heart (o͎kàn) 
out of clay, has finished his work (Abimbo͎la, 1971, pp.77-
78). The lifeless body is then taken to Olódùmarè, the 
supreme deity, who infuses it with è͎mí (life force). The 
body, having been activated with life, goes to the house of 
Àjàlá (one of the divinities) who is responsible for making 
orí, and often referred to as “Alámò͎ tí n mo͎ rí”, that is, the 
potter who moulds the human head, to select an orí.      
According to Yoruba traditional belief, as opined 
by Wande Abimbola, the orí selected by an individual 
determines the life course and the personality of its 
possessor on earth. Hence, Abimbo͎la states that:
The choice of a good orí ensures that the individual concerned 
would lead a successful and prosperous life on earth while the 
choice of a bad orí condemns the individual concerned to a life 
of failure (1976, p.80).
 Orí, according to many scholars as mentioned earlier, 
with the exception of Oladipo, is believed to be the 
sole determinant of human personality and at the same 
time represents human destiny. It is responsible for the 
actuality and significance of man on earth.  According to 
Bolaji Idowu, orí is responsible for human destiny; it is 
the essence of human personality which rules, control and 
guides the life and activities of a person (1962, p.170). 
Awolalu also gives a good description of the Yoruba 
conception of orí’s responsibility as the personality soul 
in the following words:
We are, however, convinced that when the Yoruba speak of orí 
they mean something more than the physical head. They are 
referring to the personality-soul, which is believed to be capable 
of ruling, controlling and guiding the life and activities of man. 
The people believe that success or failure in life depends on orí 
and its quality (1979, p.9).
Understandably from the above, the Yoruba believe that 
orí is the indicator of one’s purpose in life. The choice 
of a good orí ensures that the person in question would 
lead a successful and prosperous life on earth, while the 
choice of a bad orí condemns the individual concerned to 
a life of failure and doom. Gbadege͎s͎in says that “a person 
is what he is in virtue of what he is predestined to be his 
character.” (1992, p.183)
While Plato’s analysis of the tripartite soul shows that 
an individual is in total control of his personality through 
the harmonious relationship of the three-part soul and 
the attributed virtues, the Yoruba believe that human 
personality is controlled by his destiny through his choice 
of orí. The Yoruba generally believe that the prenatal choice 
of orí determines the personality of man in the world. 
Many scholars of Yoruba tradition and culture argue that 
the Yoruba believe that there are some ways by which a 
bad orí can be altered or improved for a better orí through 
consultations with Ò ͎rúnmìlà, a deity, who may prescribe 
ètùtu ̀ (sacrifice) to that effect. Antithetically, a good orí 
can be changed for the worse through the activities of 
malevolent agents, like àjé͎ (witches) and laziness. 
Wande Abimbola, however, argues otherwise, that, 
once a person has chosen his destiny by the selection of 
an orí, it is almost impossible to alter it here on earth. The 
inferred salient point here is that one’s destiny, one’s future 
existence or whatever one becomes in life or whatever 
activities or events that occur in one’s life are all traceable to 
the type of destiny one’s orí chose for one during creation. 
This point is proven in Ola Rotimi’s The God’s Are Not 
to Blame, where O͎de͎wale is destined to kill his father and 
have children through his mother. O͎de ͎wale tries to avert 
this destiny by running away. However, the more he runs, 
the closer he moves to his destiny, which he later fulfils. 
Although, Wande Abimbola has argued in some 
of  his earlier works that orí can be regarded as a major 
determinant of human personality in Yoruba traditional 
thought and that the choice of orí is irrevocable, he 
observes in his work entitled: Iwapele: The Concept of 
Good Character in “Ifa” Literacy Corpus that when 
a person chooses a good or bad orí, the individual 
needs to supplement it with the use of e͎bo͎ or ètùtu ̀ 
(sacrifice) and the use of his e͎sè͎ (spiritual leg) which 
requires strong will and earnest efforts in order to attain 
a suitable and desirable personality. In other words, 
Wande Abimbola, like Oladipo, is of the opinion that 
orí is not the sole determinant of human personality but 
that other components, such as e͎sè͎ (spiritual leg), ìwa ̀ 
(character), ara (body) and è ͎mí all jointly determine 
human personality. Wande Abimbola is not alone on 
this ideal, Kola Abimbola introduces e͎sè͎ (spiritual leg) 
as the principle of individual effort or strife to realise 
the potential that has been compressed in his orí. Kola 
Abimbola strongly believes that e͎sè͎ is an important part 
of human personality both in the physical and spiritual 
senses. To him, e͎sè͎ (physical leg), just like orí (physical 
head), has spiritual counterpart. 
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 It is important to note the argument of Balogun that 
orí is limited to issues of material success, such as wealth, 
riches and success in one’s chosen profession. In other 
words, orí has nothing to do with moral character and 
does not have any effect on all human actions or inaction. 
According to him, “nowhere in any of the Yoruba ancient 
scriptures (i.e. Ifa literary corpus, Ijala and Iwi Egungun 
and Esa Egungun) is there the claim that moral character 
can be pre-determined by one’s earlier choice of orí” 
(2007, p.125). Thus, to him, orí is not about the issue of 
moral character but issues about material prosperity or 
impoverished destiny. If the idea introduced by Balogun is 
plausible, the question then is: what factor or factors is/are 
responsible for human personality?
Ekanola notes that the Yoruba recognizes the fact that 
an individual is a free moral agent, that is, he is free to do 
or not to do certain things. To him, the Yoruba believe that 
it is the choice of an individual to decide “whether to steal 
or not to steal, tell the truth, or be kind to people” (2006, 
p.46). Even though man seems to have the freedom of 
choice to build his own personality, from Ekanola’s point 
of view, he is not absolutely free, for there are certain 
things that are beyond his control. These factors are 
identified by Ekanola:
It seems that no one is free in an absolute sense, even in those 
areas where freedom may be exercised. This is because a 
number of external factors which people do not have much 
control over, and of which they are frequently not conscious, 
often affect or influence the way of their actions and character. 
These may be classified into two sorts: Factors of heredity and 
factors of environment (2006, p.46).   
The factors of heredity are attributed to all inborn 
“propensities” which are common to a race or family, 
such as “certain physical characteristics, diseases, and 
habits”. Environmental factors, according to Ekanola, 
include earthquake, flood, drought and various climatic 
changes. Socio-environmental factors are also regarded 
as contributing to development of human personality, 
such as those happenings in the society “that may 
influence individuals either at the level of specific 
actions or at the level of dispositions and characters” this 
includes war (2006, pp.46-47). Gbadege ͎s ͎in, though he 
asserts that orí plays an important role in determining 
human personality, he is also of the opinion that what we 
call personality is defined, shaped and developed within 
the context of a community as conveyed in Ekanola’s 
socio-environmental factor. Gbadege ͎s ͎in asserts that “a 
person is what he is in virtue of what he is predestined to 
be, his character, and the communal influence on him” 
(1992, p.183). To him, it is the combination of these 
elements that constitute an individual’s personality. He 
writes further:
A person whose existence and personality is dependent on the 
community is expected in turn to contribute his own quota 
to the continued existence of the community, which nurtures 
him and partakes in his destiny. This is the ultimate meaning 
of human existence. The crown of personal life is to bear fruit 
(beget offspring); the crown of communal life is to be useful 
to one’s community. The meaning of one’s life is measured by 
one’s commitment to social ideals and communal existence 
(1992, p.184).
Many scholars of Yoruba philosophy and traditional 
thought ague on the important roles played by orí as the 
sole determinant of human personality. Bolaji Idowu, and 
Hallen and Sodipo declare orí as the sole determinant of 
human personality. Oladipo, Wande Abimbola, and Kola 
Abimbola claim that there are other components of the 
human person apart from orí that play important roles in 
forming human personality. To Oladipo o͎ po ͎lo ͎ (brain), 
o ͎kàn and ìfun all have different roles in forming human 
personality. Wande Abimbola notes that e͎sè͎ (spiritual leg), 
ara (body) and è ͎mí (the life force) all jointly determine 
human personality. Kola Abimbola also asserts that the 
spiritual leg (e͎sè͎) has a lot to do for a person to develop his 
personality.  Balogun is of the opinion that orí has little to 
do with human personality since its primary responsibility 
concerns material prosperity or impoverishment; therefore, 
freewill comes in. From Ekanola’s evaluation, even though 
man is viewed as free moral agent responsible for his 
personality, certain factors still have control over him, 
regulating his character, which forms part of his personality. 
Ekanola, like Balogun, is of the view that orí has little or 
nothing to do with human personality.
5 .   L O G I C A L  C O M PA R I S O N  O F 
THE SOUL IN PLATO AND YORUBA 
TRADITIONAL THOUGHT 
Plato’s chariot allegory is indeed a symbolic depiction 
of the tripartite analysis of the soul. One of the horses 
drawing the chariot is good while the other is defective. 
The good horse represents the spirit, which is noble, 
well formed and possessing the tendency to act well and 
magnificently. Conversely, the other horse, representing 
the appetite, is fraudulent, ill made and stiff-necked. In 
order for the tripartite soul of Plato to act harmoniously 
for the betterment of an individual, each part of the soul 
receives educational programme which will enable it to 
carry out its respective social functions properly.
From the Yoruba conception of human personality, 
it can be deduced that it is the combination of the orí 
(inner head), o͎kàn (heart), ìwa ̀ (character) and e ͎se ͎ ̀ (leg) 
that jointly determine and constitute human personality. 
O͎kàn is described as the seat of thought and the abode of 
conscious identity that usually determines the emotional 
state of a person which, in turn, affects his personality. 
This then explains why some people are naturally 
impatient, eager to carry out certain desires of their hearts. 
Hence, the function of o͎kàn (heart) in Yoruba traditional 
conception of human personality can be equated to Plato’s 
spirited part of the tripartite soul, that which comprises 
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emotional motive. This aspect of the tripartite soul, 
according to Plato, is the motivating force that generally 
accounts for self-assertion, ambition and love of honour 
which makes man strive for self-esteem by competing 
with others. When its desires are frustrated emotional 
responses, such as anger and indignation behaviour 
naturally flows from such responses ensue.  
Orí (inner head) can be said to represent Plato’s rational 
part of the soul. Plato’s description of this part fits well 
with Bolaji Idowu’s analysis of orí. Plato sees the rational 
part as being capable of ruling, caring and guiding the other 
two parts to attain and maintain a healthy soul that works in 
compliance with inner justice. According to Bolaji Idowu, 
when the Yoruba speak of orí, they mean something more 
than the physical head. They are referring to the personality-
soul, which is believed to be capable of ruling, controlling 
and guiding the life and activities of man. The third part of 
Plato’s tripartite soul, appetitive, is in correlation with the 
Yoruba conception of e͎sè͎ (spiritual leg). According to Plato, 
appetite is that desire that drives man to seek out his basic 
bodily needs such as food, drink and love. And according 
to the Yoruba traditional thought, it is the e͎sè͎ (spiritual leg) 
that strives to bring to realize the desires of the heart (o͎kàn) 
as destined by the inner head (orí).
CONCLUSION
As evident in this paper, Plato considers the soul to be 
the sole determinant of human personality through the 
harmonious interaction of the tripartite soul. From the 
Yoruba point of view, however, orí inu ́ (inner head), 
which corresponds to the Platonic soul, is not the sole 
determinant of human personality. It is the tripartite 
harmonious interaction of orí  (inner head), o͎kàn 
(heart), e͎sè͎ (leg) that determines and constitutes human 
personality. The longstanding impact of Plato’s analysis 
of the soul and the Yoruba tripartite relation of orí (inner 
head), o͎kàn (heart) and e͎sè͎ (leg) can be seen on Western 
civilization, particularly in the Christian tradition, where 
the soul is considered to be a tripartite relation of mind, 
body and spirit.
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